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FLOATING LUNGS: FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
SELF-INDUCED ABORTION PROSECUTIONS
AZIZA AHMED

ABSTRACT
Pregnancy that ends in stillbirth or late miscarriage—particularly where a
person gives birth outside of a hospital—raises the specter of criminal behavior.
To successfully prosecute a person for the death of a child, however, requires
proving that the child was born alive. Prosecutors mobilize forensic science as
an objective way to determine life. This Essay focuses on one such forensic
method: the hydrostatic lung test (“HLT”), also known as the floating lung test
(“FLT”). Although there are debates about the “correct” way to perform the
exam, in essence, the test requires that a forensic scientist take pieces of the lung
and place them in water. If the lungs float, indicating a breath has been taken,
scientists conclude that the baby was born alive. If the lungs sink, the infant is
thought to have died in utero, thereby exculpating the accused.
The evidence that a fetus has taken at least one breath and was therefore born
alive has numerous legal consequences. Depending on the jurisdiction,
prosecutors can charge the woman with homicide, infanticide, neglect of a
dependent, and neglect of a dependent resulting in death. Each charge carries
harsh criminal penalties. Despite numerous doubts within the scientific
community about the test’s veracity and growing advocacy against it, when
examining cases that have used the HLT over the decades, we see that the
perceived reliability of the test by adjudicators remains.
Drawing on historical research and a review of cases from the mid-1800s to
the present, this Essay engages with a larger literature on forensic science and
criminal law to interrogate the relationship between scientific expertise,
evidence, and lawmaking in the context of self-induced abortion late in
pregnancy. The Essay makes two arguments: First, it argues that adjudication
is integral to the validation of forensic science and the legitimation of the HLT.
In other words, courts play a key role in sustaining the belief that the HLT is a
true test of whether a child was born alive. Second, this Essay argues that given
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the lack of scientific evidence on the HLT, it becomes necessary to turn to
broader social and moral rationales for the ongoing reliance on the test. I
explore two possibilities: First, as the carceral state has taken hold, forensic
science offers a purportedly scientific means of furthering the project of holding
individuals responsible for their behavior. Second, courts rely on the HLT as a
means to respond to a moral panic about pregnancy and abortion.
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INTRODUCTION
Pregnancy that ends in stillbirth or late miscarriage—particularly where a
person gives birth outside of a hospital—raises the specter of criminal behavior. 1
To successfully prosecute a person for the death of a child, however, requires
proving that the child was born alive. Prosecutors mobilize forensic science as
an objective way to determine life. This Essay focuses on one such forensic
method: the hydrostatic lung test (“HLT”), also known as the floating lung test
(“FLT”). Although there are debates about the “correct” way to perform the
exam, in essence, the test requires that a forensic scientist take pieces of the lung
and place them in water. If the lungs float, indicating a breath has been taken,
scientists conclude that the baby was born alive. If the lungs sink, the infant is
thought to have died in utero, thereby exculpating the accused.
The issue of forensic science in pregnancy- and abortion-related prosecutions,
and the HLT in particular, came under increased scrutiny by the public with the
prosecution of Purvi Patel in Indiana.2 On July 11, 2013, Patel ingested an
abortifacient—a drug designed to induce an abortion—that she had ordered
online. She then began to miscarry. After delivering the fetus, which she
perceived to be dead, she placed it into a plastic bag and put the bag in a
dumpster. She then went to the hospital. Once there, two physicians, Dr. Tracy
Byrne and Dr. Kelly McGuire3—the latter a member of the Association of ProLife Obstetricians and Gynecologists4—examined Patel. After some hesitation,
Patel described taking the abortifacient and passing the fetus. She explained that
she had been ten to twelve weeks pregnant. Through a physical exam, the
physicians determined that Patel had been further along in the pregnancy than
she claimed. Dr. McGuire called the police and accompanied them to the site
where Patel described leaving the fetus. The fetus was retrieved from the
dumpster. The autopsy of the fetus by the State’s pathologist determined that it
was twenty-five weeks in utero; the pathologist for the defense later argued that
the date was likely closer to twenty-three or twenty-four weeks. 5 McGuire,
perhaps influenced by his politics, dated the pregnancy at thirty weeks.

1
This Essay switches between the more trans-inclusive language of “person” and the more
gendered language of “woman.” The choice of language reflects the language of the case or
scholarship being described. In the cases discussed in this Essay, no prosecution was found
against a person who self-identified as transgender in legal materials.
2
Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
3
Amy Gastelum, Miscarriage or Murder?, GUERNICA MAG. (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.guernicamag.com/amy-gastelum-miscarriage-or-murder/ [https://perma.cc
/37AS-TNVA].
4
Kelly Wayne McGuire, M.D., FACOG, OBGYN ASSOCS. N. IND.,
http://www.obgynni.com/meet-our-doctors/kelly-wayne-mcguire-md/ [https://perma.cc
/4N7K-953C] (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
5
Appellant’s Brief at 9, Patel, 60 N.E.3d 1041 (No. 71A04-1504-CR-166), 2015 WL
9418308, at *9.
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Most controversially, the forensics expert for the State utilized the HLT in
order to prove that the infant had taken at least one breath. The evidence that a
fetus has taken at least one breath and was therefore born alive has many legal
consequences. Depending on the jurisdiction, prosecutors can charge the woman
with homicide, infanticide, neglect of a dependent, and neglect of a dependent
resulting in death. Each charge carries harsh criminal penalties. Despite
numerous doubts about the test’s veracity within the scientific community and
growing advocacy against it, when examining cases that have used the HLT over
the decades, we see that the perceived reliability of the test by adjudicators
remains.6
Drawing on historical research and a review of cases from the mid-1800s to
the present, this Essay engages with a larger literature on forensic science and
criminal law to interrogate the relationship between scientific expertise,
evidence, and lawmaking in the context of self-induced abortion late in
pregnancy.7 The Essay makes two arguments: First, it argues that adjudication
is integral to the validation of forensic science and the legitimation of the HLT.
In other words, courts play a key role in sustaining the belief that the HLT is a
true test of whether a child was born alive. Second, this Essay argues that given
the lack of scientific evidence on the HLT, it becomes necessary to turn to
broader social and moral rationales for the ongoing reliance on the test. I explore
two possibilities: First, as the carceral state has taken hold, forensic science
offers a purportedly scientific means of holding individuals responsible for their
behavior.8 The use of forensics provides an objective rationale for blaming the
accused and confidence in the finality of the decision—two of the central goals
of the criminal legal system. The HLT demonstrates the way forensics underpins
prosecutions in the context of pregnancy and childbirth and, in turn, how courts
legitimate scientific claims. Second, courts rely on the HLT as a means to
respond to a moral panic about pregnancy and abortion. This moral panic reflects
past and ongoing racialized and gendered social anxieties around pregnancy and
abortion. It fits within a long history of cases in which medical and forensic
evidence and expertise was mobilized, shaped, and legitimated by courts for the
sake of successful prosecutions of pregnant women, mothers, and caretakers in
the contexts of the “crack baby” epidemic and Shaken Baby Syndrome.9 Today,
6
Leon Neyfakh, False Certainty: Why Did the Pathologist in the Purvi Patel Feticide
Case Use the Discredited “Lung Float Test” to Show Her Fetus Was Born Alive?, SLATE
(Feb. 5, 2015, 4:03 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/02/purvi-patel-feticidewhy-did-the-pathologist-use-the-discredited-lung-float-test.html [https://perma.cc/WT5J98VF].
7
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1015-19 (2008).
8
Cf. MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA
FINGERPRINTING 2 (2008).
9
See MICHELE GOODWIN, POLICING THE WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD (2020); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY
154-67 (1997); DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME”
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the HLT provides a way to legitimately prosecute women whose pregnancies
are stillbirths or miscarriages or who self-abort.
This Essay proceeds in six parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the
literature on the rise of the carceral state and its discussion of pregnancy-,
caretaking-, and birth-related crimes. Part II turns to the subset of cases of
concern here: women who are prosecuted for the purported death of a newborn.
These cases frequently rely on the HLT to demonstrate that a mother killed her
child. Part III considers the Patel case as a contemporary example. Despite its
ongoing influence in infanticide trials, there are no comprehensive analyses of
the history, application, and impact of the HLT. Part IV begins to fill this void
by first examining the test’s history and debates in forensic pathology about the
test and then by outlining the implications of the “one breath” rule in criminal
law and, more broadly, on legal and medical ideas of viability. While engaging
with the broader context in which the HLT is used, Part IV also hones in on the
use of the HLT in prosecutions of self-induced abortion. As advocates push for
greater access to medication abortion and greater abortion restrictions are
enacted, and as women increasingly self-induce, more women will be vulnerable
to prosecution. The door to prosecution for the range of crimes listed is opened
further as viability becomes more likely earlier in pregnancy or as restrictive
abortion laws make it so that early-stage fetuses are deemed to be children. Part
V explores several rationales for why and how the HLT survives and examines
the failure of evidentiary standards in preventing questionable forensic science
from entering trials, the legitimation effect of courts on contested science, and
the raced and gendered application of the HLT. Part VI considers a way forward.
I.

ABORTION, PREGNANCY, AND PARENTING IN THE CARCERAL STATE

Scholars have dedicated increasing attention to the intersection of pregnancy,
abortion, and the carceral state in the context of the broader critique of policing
and mass incarceration. Unpacking this literature provides a framework for
understanding how conceptions of forensic science are wrapped into the
expansion of a prosecution-based approach to social issues.
There are several origination accounts about how and why the carceral state
came to be and how the criminal justice system so quickly spread into the
governance and management of people’s daily lives. Sociologists of law,
including Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, describe the emergence of a
new penology that marked a deep shift in the 1970s and 1980s in discourses,
objectives, and techniques of governance that prioritized criminal law. 10 For
Feeley and Simon, the shift in discourse was embraced by a new language of
risk and probability, changes in objectives including the efficient control of
rehabilitation and crime control, and new techniques that aggregated offenders
AND THE INERTIA OF INJUSTICE,

at xi-xiv (2014); Maxine Eichner, Bad Medicine: Parents, the
State, and the Charge of “Medical Child Abuse,” 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 273 (2016).
10
Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992).
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rather than individualizing approaches to accomplishing the goals of the
criminal justice system.11 In his book Governing Through Crime, Simon argues
that the rise of the criminal law framework for viewing social problems provided
a powerful tool “with which to interpret and frame all forms of social action as
a problem of governance.”12 In his work, sociologist Loïc Wacquant drives
home the connection between race and the logic of the criminal justice system.
In From Slavery to Mass Incarceration, Wacquant describes the remnants of the
“dark ghetto” and “carceral apparatus” as the most recent iteration of control
exerted over African Americans.13 Wacquant argues that slavery and mass
incarceration are on a continuum of institutional forms, each operating for the
purpose of labor extraction and social ostracization.14 More recently, legal
scholar Michelle Alexander describes how the criminal justice system
perpetuates a system of racial hierarchy—a caste system—where Black and
Brown men (in particular) have become a new underclass.15 Alexander connects
the rise of mass incarceration to similar social conditions and ideological
constructs that supported the rise of neoliberalism and the diminishment of
welfarism in the United States.16 Like those theorists before her, Alexander plays
close attention to the War on Drugs wrought by the Reagan Administration in
the 1980s in the context of a contracting welfare state.17
Feminist legal theorists, building on these larger questions of governance,
political economy, and race, have approached questions of gender in the carceral

11

Id. at 451-52.
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 17 (2007) (“When
we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of knowledge historically associated
with it—criminal law, popular crime narrative, and criminology—available outside their
limited original subject domains as powerful tools with which to interpret and frame all forms
of social action as a problem for governance.”).
13
Loïc Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘Race Question’
in the US, 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41, 41 (2002); see also Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing,
85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 548 (2017).
14
Wacquant, supra note 13, at 41-42.
15
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 21 (2012).
16
Id. at 40-58 (connecting 1960s-1970s racial tensions and competing ideologies of
Republicans and Democrats regarding race, poverty, and crime to rise of incarceration and
reduction in welfare). For an examination of the relationship between the rise in mass
incarceration and neoliberalism, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE
MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 40-44 (2011).
17
ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 48-49 (highlighting Reagan’s anecdote about “welfare
queens” and Reagan’s War on Drugs); see also ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON
POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 3 (2016)
(challenging the idea of the origin stories that begin in the 1980s and instead arguing that, in
the 1960s, during then-President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, American saw an uptick
in federal efforts to control crime, thus channeling resources in its direction).
12
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state from several perspectives. One influential strand of scholarship examines
how feminists played a role in aiding the entry of the criminal justice system into
the home. In the context of family violence, for example, feminists who
specifically advocated for the need to hold individuals (mostly men) accountable
for harm done to women provided the political fodder needed to deepen a
criminal law approach to social issues. In recent years, the push for increased
involvement of criminal justice in the home—particularly in the context of
violence against women—has been scrutinized and critiqued by feminists who
see a link between feminist reliance on criminal law and the rise of the carceral
state. This critique, which names the earlier feminist push for increased
involvement of criminal law movement “carceral feminism,” 18 calls into
question the reliance of feminists on police and prosecutors to accomplish
feminist goals. In doing so, scholars interrogate how the widespread support of
the criminal justice system by feminists now backfires and often harms
subgroups of women.19
A second strand of feminist legal theorizing on the carceral state examines the
specific impact of laws and policies on gendered crimes, including those
pertaining to pregnancy, parenting, and caretaking.20 Within this literature
scholars have considered how science and forensics have been mobilized to
justify prosecutions.21 Two prominent examples are Shaken Baby Syndrome
(“SBS”) and the “crack baby” epidemic. In her book Flawed Convictions:
18
Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The
Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36 SIGNS
45, 56 (2010) (“[A] myopic feminist focus on the criminalization of rape and domestic
violence during the 1990s contrasted with grassroots and early second-wave feminist concerns
about women’s social and economic empowerment.”).
19
See Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2000); Leigh Goodmark,
Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic
Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime,
92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 748 (2007) (“By embracing harsh criminalization policies, domestic
violence reformers actually strayed from the underlying values of the feminist movement.
They have also bolstered conservative ideologies and thus reinforced, rather than dismantled,
inequality.”).
20
For writing on the criminalization of pregnancy, see GOODWIN, supra note 9, at 28;
ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 153-54; Wendy A. Bach, Prosecuting Poverty, Criminalizing Care,
60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 809, 810 (2019); and Priscilla A. Ocen, Incapacitating Motherhood,
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2191, 2191 (2018).
21
The few studies that exist provide a view of arrests and prosecutions in the context of
pregnancy. The most recent survey is a 2013 study that reports on 413 cases from forty-four
states and Washington, D.C., as well as federal jurisdictions from 1973-2005. See Lynn M.
Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the
United States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 300 (2013). Women who were prosecuted were largely women
of color and African American women. Id. at 311. Most faced forms of socioeconomic
disadvantage. Id. The majority of prosecutions were for drug use during pregnancy. Id. at 315.
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“Shaken Baby Syndrome” and the Inertia of Justice, Professor Deborah
Tuerkheimer argues that SBS emerged as a syndrome constructed through
litigation in an effort to find accountability for the death of infants.22
Tuerkheimer shows how three symptoms—bleeding beneath the outer layer of
membranes surrounding the brain, bleeding in the retina, and brain swelling—
have come to be viewed as evidence of SBS, resulting in the convictions of
caretakers for killing children on their watch.23 The idea of SBS gained
legitimacy through court cases and physician buy-in, eventually becoming its
own identifiable syndrome.
The purported “crack baby” epidemic, which has now received a public
reckoning,24 is another powerful example of how criminal law and science
coproduce a reality in which new facts come into play with detrimental
consequences.25 In her early work, legal scholar Dorothy Roberts describes how
pregnant Black women became victims of an aggressive campaign to punish
women for drug use during pregnancy in the 1980s.26 Based on studies that
conflated the symptoms of premature birth with drug use in newborns,
prosecutors justified targeting pregnant women. Many Black women were
treated with suspicion, arrested, and incarcerated as they attempted to get health
services during their pregnancies.27 Today the crack baby epidemic is largely
understood to be the product of racism substantiated by methodologically poor
studies. The most recent evidence suggested that the birth and long-term
outcomes predicted for children exposed to crack in utero were instead
associated with poverty.28
Both SBS and the crack baby epidemic serve as examples of what sociologist
Elizabeth Armstrong describes in her work on fetal alcohol syndrome as
“biomedical entrepreneurship,” or the growth of diagnosis and expertise around
a new type of illness or disease.29 As we see with both SBS and the crack baby
epidemic, this type of biomedical entrepreneurship is legitimated by the legal

22

TUERKHEIMER, supra note 9, at 13-14.
Id. at xi.
24
Editorial Board, Opinion, Slandering the Unborn, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/28/opinion/crack-babies-racism.html.
25
Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-production, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE COPRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 9-10 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004).
26
ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 153.
27
Id. at 157-59.
28
Laura M. Betancourt et al., Adolescents with and Without Gestational Cocaine
Exposure: Longitudinal Analysis of Inhibitory Control, Memory and Receptive Language, 33
NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 36, 44 (2011).
29
Elizabeth M. Armstrong, Diagnosing Moral Disorder: The Discovery and Evolution of
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 47 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2025, 2025 (1998) (“The recognition of a new
disease or syndrome is sometimes the result of serendipity, but more often the result of
determined investigation and scientific entrepreneurship. In the case of fetal alcohol
syndrome, moral fervor powered the discovery as much as medical curiosity.”).
23
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processes associated with the criminal justice system and by the momentum to
prosecute.
Two additional features of SBS and crack baby prosecutions are worth noting.
First, both offer accounts of how courts legitimate particular medical and
forensic narratives of truth despite gaps in the literature and/or contestation in
the relevant scientific communities. As Tuerkheimer shows, in SBS a triad of
diagnostic factors was pushed by prosecutors and accepted by the courts as a
way to demonstrate that the syndrome had occurred.30 Courts played a central
role in ensuring the legal legitimacy of the syndrome as the medical profession
began its own attempts to name and identify the phenomenon of children dying
while with a caretaker. The crack baby epidemic had a similar dynamic.
Contested evidence about crack-cocaine’s impact on infants was legitimated by
the courts as fact, which in turn justified the arrest and prosecution of mothers.
With both SBS and the crack baby epidemic, the courts helped solidify a national
panic about parents mistreating their children and mothers using crackcocaine.31
Second, both SBS and the “crack baby” epidemic occurred in the 1980s and
1990s, a time in which we see both the retreat of the welfare state and the
rigorous application of criminal law to pregnancy, parenting, and caretaking that
continues today.32 The crack baby epidemic reflects this most explicitly. Rather
than support women with social services and treatment, women lost custody of
their children and found themselves in prison. Using Simon’s lens, criminal law
became the way to address a perceived social problem, precluding the possibility
of other solutions—among them a range of public health, harm-reduction, and
housing options. This idea to prosecute and drive home ideas of individual
responsibility rather than to consider the broader structural forces continues as a
theme in the context of prosecutions for abortion-related crimes.

30

See supra note 24.
Questioning the validity of the forensic and medical evidence of perpetrator
identification has become central to the overall critique of the criminal justice system. The
2009 National Academy of Sciences Report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward, took a hard look at the basis for various types of perpetrator
identification. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4PX-DK98]. Despite criticism of the
science and practices of DNA, eyewitness, and fingerprint identification, each has its own
dynamics. The critique of DNA evidence often links back to basic errors in technology,
mistakes made by forensic scientists, and issues in labs including cross-contamination. Id. at
132. Eyewitness testimony has been subject to intense scrutiny for biases in the minds of the
witness, which may lead to incorrect identification. Id. at 122-23. And fingerprints have been
revealed to be faulty by DNA evidence, which has served to exonerate many. Id. at 37.
32
For more on the carceral response to welfare and parenting, see generally Tonya L.
Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income
Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617 (2012).
31
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Forensic evidence has received a hard look over the past few decades with
scholars, advocates, and policymakers interrogating the authoritative role of
purportedly objective science to provide a rationalization for findings of guilt or
innocence in criminal trials.33 This has also been true in debates surrounding
SBS and crack-cocaine use during pregnancy. This Essay next turns to yet
another forensic method that is deserving of scrutiny—the HLT—and its
application to a carefully curated political issue: self-induced abortion as
infanticide.
II.

SELF-INDUCED ABORTION

Prosecutions of self-induced abortion represent a small slice of the broader
pie of abortion- and pregnancy-related prosecutions.34 The term “self-induced
abortion” refers to the act of a woman ending her own pregnancy. The
prosecution of self-induced abortion is yet another instance in which forensic
science, no matter how contested, continues to provide a seemingly objective
basis for prosecutions.
This Part begins with a survey of the literature on pregnancy-related
complications today. This is followed by an overview of the laws governing selfinduced abortion. Finally, we turn to the HLT and its role in successful
prosecutions of pregnant women.
A.

Legal, Policy, and Ethical Frameworks for Self-Induced Abortion

The advent of self-administrable medication to induce abortion
revolutionized the possibilities of how abortion care could be delivered. 35 The
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved the drugs for medication
abortion in 2000, and by 2014 medication abortion made up approximately 31%
of all nonhospital abortions.36 The current FDA-approved medication regimen
for self-induced abortion is as follows: for up to seventy days since the patient’s
last menstrual period a patient takes two medications—mifepristone and

33

For critical examinations of forensic evidence, see generally D AVID A. HARRIS, FAILED
EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE (2012); LYNCH ET AL., supra note 8;
ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA (2015); and
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE
INNOCENT (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017).
34
Most notably, the political imperative for pushing these prosecutions came from
conservatives who made the prosecution of infanticide a part of the Republican Party
platform. 2016 Republican Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 18, 2016),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2016-republican-party-platform
[https://perma.cc/6NSL-8B5Q].
35
This is not to suggest that women were not already attempting to end their pregnancies
at home before the advent of self-administrable abortion medication, or to suggest that women
had not already begun to self-medicate.
36
Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Abortion Incidence and Service Availability in the
United States, 2014, 49 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 17, 21 (2017).
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misoprostol. The former blocks progesterone necessary for pregnancy; the latter
induces contractions and ends the pregnancy. While the FDA limits the
distribution of mifepristone to clinics, hospitals, and medical offices,
misoprostol is more widely available.37
The data on self-induced abortion is difficult to gather, but studies show that
the practice is widespread. A study by Jenna Jerman, Rachel Jones, and Tsuyoshi
Onda concluded that 1.3% of abortion patients reported that they had taken
misoprostol to “bring back their period or end a pregnancy.” 38 The study was
consistent with earlier research that demonstrated that in 2008, 1.2% of patients
accessing clinical abortions attempted to use misoprostol to end pregnancy and
an additional 1.4% attempted to use other substances in order to self-induce
abortion.39 A 2010 study of over 1400 women found that 4.6% of women
attempted to self-induce an abortion using misoprostol and other substances.40
A 2015 study found that in states with extensive restrictions on abortion, such
as Texas, more than 100,000 women had attempted self-induced abortion. 41
And, in 2015, there were 700,000 Google searches for information regarding
self-induced abortion.42
Advocates for self-induced abortions describe the ideal care scenario as one
in which women are able to have access to self-induced abortions, the

37

Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.cfm [https://perma.cc
/YY3S-5VUZ] (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
38
JENNA JERMAN, RACHEL K. JONES & TSUYOSHI ONDA, CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S.
ABORTION PATIENTS IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008, at 8 (2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/characteristics-us-abortionpatients-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P8J-WWB2].
39
Rachel K. Jones, How Commonly Do US Abortion Patients Report Attempts to SelfInduce?, 204 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 23.e1, 23.e1-.e3 (2011).
40
Daniel Grossman et al., Self-Induction of Abortion Among Women in the United States,
18 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 136, 137 (2010); see also Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth
Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts Providers—and the Women They Serve—
in the Crosshairs, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 9, 9 (2014).
41
Jenna Jerman, Tsuyoshi Onda & Rachel K. Jones, What are People Looking for When
They Google “Self-Abortion”?, 97 CONTRACEPTION 510, 510 (2018). See generally D.
Grossman et al., Knowledge, Opinion and Experience Related to Abortion Self-Induction in
Texas, 92 CONTRACEPTION 360 (2015). While recent data suggests that overall abortions are
decreasing, these numbers do not include the number of women who self-abort. See Claire
Cain Miller & Margot Sanger-Katz, Researchers on Abortion Find Blind Spot in Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2019, at A21 (“The number of abortions performed in American clinics was
lower in 2017 than in any year since abortion became legal nationwide in 1973, new data
showed this week. But that does not count a growing number of women who are managing
their abortions themselves, without going to a medical office — often by buying pills
illicitly.”).
42
Jerman, Onda & Jones, supra note 41, at 510.
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information they need, and a provider of their choice when they need one.43 A
medication abortion is safe and legal—according to advocates and health
professionals—when the abortion is done within legal 44 and medical time
limits,45 provided by the legally required health professional,46 and done with
medication received from a pharmacy.47 If unable to meet these requirements,
women may resort to ordering abortion medication online. This comes with the
risk that medications ordered online may be fake or contaminated, and women
may not be within the recommended time period for inducing the abortion.
Alongside the medical harm that may accompany taking an abortifacient outside
of the medically proscribed timeframe, a self-induced abortion outside the
legally permitted time also opens up a woman to prosecution.
Criminal laws used to prosecute self-induced abortion vary widely. They
include feticide,48 solicitation of murder,49 direct bans on self-induced
abortions,50 and fetal assault.51 Where fetuses are deemed to have been “born
alive,” charges of homicide and neglect of a dependent become possible.52
Because of laws that consider a fetus viable after twenty weeks or, in some cases,
after twenty-three weeks, women are most vulnerable to prosecution after week
twenty of their pregnancy. 53
As the Supreme Court has noted,54 fetal viability is a shifting line based on
medical developments. Yet a medical definition of viability is not clear. The
43
See, e.g., Megan K. Donovan, Self-Managed Medication Abortion: Expanding the
Available Options for U.S. Abortion Care, 21 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 41, 41-42 (2018).
44
These vary by state. See State Bans on Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER
INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions
[https://perma.cc/R2HM-7S3V] (last updated Apr. 1, 2020).
45
Abortion Pill, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, https://americanpregnancy.org/unplannedpregnancy/abortion-pill/ [https://perma.cc/5DTV-G4ZM] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
46
This requirement is dictated by state regulation. See Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER
INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/medication-abortion
[https://perma.cc/A8TC-Q6NJ] (last updated Apr. 1, 2020).
47
See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 43, at 41-43.
48
See, e.g., Kevin Hayes, Did Christine Taylor Take Abortion into Her Own Hands?, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 2, 2010, 6:55 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/did-christine-taylor-takeabortion-into-her-own-hands/ [https://perma.cc/2M8Q-7TW7].
49
Nina Liss-Schultz, Women Who Face Prosecution for Home Abortions Finally Have a
Number to Call, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crimejustice/2018/10/self-induced-abortion-diy-home-prosecution-legal-help-1/
[https://perma.cc/GTD6-6UH9].
50
SIA LEGAL TEAM, ROE’S UNFINISHED PROMISE: DECRIMINALIZING ABORTION ONCE AND
FOR ALL 6 (2018), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/8f83e4_dd27a51ce72e42db8b09eb6aab
381358.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YBP-P6EL].
51
Id. at 14.
52
See, e.g., infra note 60 and accompanying text.
53
For examples of such laws, see SIA LEGAL TEAM, supra note 50, at 10-12.
54
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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availability of medical technology, the opinions of qualified physicians, and a
malleable sense of what “life” means produce divergent and subjective ideas that
a life has or has not begun. Medical guidance offers surprisingly little clarity.
Neonatologists, for example, who work to ensure the survival of preterm infants
are guided by the Neonatal Resuscitation Program (“NRP”) of the American
Heart Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics. Their guidelines
suggest that the twenty-three-week to twenty-five-week period is a gray area for
resuscitation.55 The resuscitation guidelines of the AMA Code of Medical
Ethics—followed by the NRP—state that
the primary consideration for decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment
for seriously ill newborns should be what is best for the newborn. Factors
that should be weighed are (1) the chance that therapy will succeed, (2) the
risks involved with treatment and nontreatment, (3) the degree to which the
therapy, if successful, will extend life, (4) the pain and discomfort
associated with the therapy, and (5) the anticipated quality of life for the
newborn with and without treatment. 56
In other words, the AMA guidelines give broad discretion to physicians for
resuscitation of “seriously ill” newborns—a decision typically made hand-inhand with parents.
These ethical guidelines and physicians’ broad discretion have been subject
to political pressure from antichoice groups seeking to narrow the range of time
in which a physician or parent can choose not to resuscitate. The 2002 Born
Alive Infants Protection Act (“BAIPA”), for example, defines born alive as
the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother of that
member, at any stage of development, who after such expulsion or
extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord,
or definite movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the
umbilical cord has been cut.57

55
J. Colin Partridge et al., Resuscitation of Likely Nonviable Newborns: Would
Neonatology Practices in California Change if the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act Were
Enforced?, 123 PEDIATRICS 1088, 1088 (2009) [hereinafter Partridge, Neonatology Practices]
(“The Born-Alive Infants Protection Act clariﬁed the legal status of ‘born alive’ infants, but
enforcement guidelines fail to clarify what measures are appropriate when survival is
unlikely.”). Over “50% of infants born of ˂24 weeks’ gestation die despite aggressive
resuscitation and intensive care.” Id. One study suggested that the selective nonintervention
regiment yielded greater quality-of-life years and lower costs compared with “universal
resuscitation of all infants who are delivered spontaneously between 20-23 weeks 6 days’
gestation [which] would increase costs by $313.1 million.” John Colin Partridge et al.,
Resuscitation of Likely Nonviable Infants: A Cost-Utility Analysis After the Born-Alive Infant
Protection Act, 206 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 49.e1, 49.e6 (2012).
56
AMA, The AMA Code of Medical Ethics Opinions on Seriously Ill Newborns and DoNot-Resuscitate Orders, 12 AMA J. ETHICS 554, 554 (2010).
57
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, § 8(b), 116 Stat. 926,
926 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2018)).
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The goal of the Act was to “protect infants who are born alive.” 58 The inclusion
of the language “at any stage of development” suggests that physicians are
responsible for the care of the fetus even when born prior to legal or medically
determined viability.
BAIPA has had little effect on medical practice largely because
neonatologists report not knowing about the law. 59 In part to remedy this, in
2015 the House passed the Born Alive Abortion Survivors Act.60 The Act, which
failed a roll-call vote of the Senate in 2019, stated that
any health care practitioner present at the time the child is born alive
shall—(A) exercise the same degree of professional skill, care, and
diligence to preserve the life and health of the child as a reasonably diligent
and conscientious health care practitioner would render to any other child
born alive at the same gestational age; and (B) . . . ensure that the child
born alive is immediately transported and admitted to a hospital. 61
A health care practitioner who violates this law faces imprisonment for not more
than five years, a fine, or both.62
Each of these efforts at regulating self-induced abortion bears on the questions
of when life begins and who bears responsibility for that life. However, the
reliance on punitive approaches coupled with the individual responsibility borne
out of a declaration of life begs the question: How do we know life has
objectively begun?63
III. TESTING FOR LIFE? A CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLE
Although its veracity continues to be debated, the hydrostatic lung test
(“HLT”), also known as the floating lung test (“FLT”), is the primary available
test to determine whether or not an infant should be deemed to have been born
alive.64 The test is based on whether or not an infant has taken a breath. The
58

Id. A 2009 study found that more than half of 156 interviewed neonatologists had not
heard of this law. Partridge, Neonatology Practices, supra note 55, at 1088. Nearly all
critiqued the legislation, and only 6% felt it should be enforced. Id.
59
See Partridge, Neonatology Practices, supra note 55, at 1088.
60
Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Act, H.R. 3504, 114th Cong. § 1532(e)(1) (2015)
(defining abortion as “the use or prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other
substance or device—(A) to intentionally kill the unborn child of a woman known to be
pregnant; or (B) to intentionally terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant,
with an intention other than—(i) after viability, to produce a live birth and preserve the life
and health of the child born alive; or (ii) to remove a dead unborn child”).
61
Id. § 1532(a)(1).
62
Id. § 1532(b)(1)(a).
63
See Partridge, Neonatology Practices, supra note 55, at 1089.
64
VINCENT J. DIMAIO & DOMINICK DIMAIO, FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 353 (Vernon J.
Geberth ed., 2d ed. 2001) (“At the present time, the authors place most reliance on the
hydrostatic test.”); see also SPITZ & FISHER’S MEDICOLEGAL INVESTIGATION OF DEATH:
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF PATHOLOGY TO CRIME INVESTIGATION 347 (Werner U.
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2006 version of Spitz and Fisher’s Medicolegal Investigation of Death:
Guidelines for the Application of Pathology to Crime Investigation, for example,
describes the HLT as the “best test” for assessing whether there is air in the
lung65:
This test involves placing the lung tissue in a water bath and observing
whether the tissue floats or sinks. The float test should be initially
performed by placing the entire chest block (heart, lungs and trachea) in
the water. Each lung should then be evaluated separately in addition to
small sections from each lobe. When immersed in water, the airless lung
tissue will sink. Lungs that sink are consistent with a child that did not
breathe. Lung tissue containing air will float, indicating that the child took
one or more breaths.66
The Spitz and Fisher textbook acknowledges that the test is imperfect. 67 Other
textbooks, however, go beyond merely acknowledging the test’s imperfection
and condemn it. In Pekka Saukko and Bernard Knight’s Forensic Pathology, the
authors note that they “are saddened to contemplate the number of innocent
mothers who were sent to the gallows in previous centuries on the testimony of
doctors who had an uncritical faith in this crude technique.”68 The authors refer
to the HLT as “black magic” and assert that its repeated false results make it
unreliable and a poor candidate for evidence.69 They suggest that the use of the
test can produce a “false sense of scientific validity and even . . . an eventual
miscarriage of justice.”70 Similarly, the authors of Paediatric Forensic Medicine
and Pathology argue that without other tests it is “unwise” to rely solely on the
HLT as the determinant of live birth.71
Experts that raise doubts about the test itself do so on several grounds, the
primary one being that oxygen can be introduced into the lung tissue by means
other than the infant having taken a breath. In such a situation, the test would

Spitz & Daniel J. Spitz eds., 4th ed. 2006) (1972) [hereinafter MEDICOLEGAL INVESTIGATION
OF DEATH]; Jack Moar, The Hydrostatic Test - A Valid Method of Determining Live Birth?,
18 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 109, 109 (1997) (“In a survey conducted among our
colleagues, it was found that most still made use of the hydrostatic test for lack of another
more reliable alternative.”).
65
MEDICOLEGAL INVESTIGATION OF DEATH, supra note 64, at 347.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
PEKKA SAUKKO & BERNARD KNIGHT, KNIGHT’S FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 455 (4th ed.
2004) (1991) (emphasis added); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae The Innocence Network &
Dr. Gregory J. Davis in Support of Appellant Purvi Patel at 3-7, Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (No. 71A04-1504-CR-00166) [hereinafter Innocence Network Amicus
Brief] (offering overview of critiques from forensic scientists of HLT).
69
SAUKKO & KNIGHT, supra note 68, at 456; see also PAEDIATRIC FORENSIC MEDICINE AND
PATHOLOGY 185 (Anthony Busuttil & Jean W. Keeling eds. 2009).
70
SAUKKO & KNIGHT, supra note 68, at 456.
71
PAEDIATRIC FORENSIC MEDICINE AND PATHOLOGY, supra note 69, at 185.
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produce a false positive; the lungs float not due to the fetus having taken a breath
but instead, for example, due to the decomposition process. Ironically, the FLT
can also result in a false positive if a woman attempts resuscitation of the fetus,
putting oxygen in the lungs herself.72
Purvi Patel’s case sheds light on how this science is utilized and contested in
courts. The events that led to Patel’s eventual prosecution began in the summer
of 2013. Patel had been having a relationship with a man at the fast-food chain
where she worked.73 She lived with her parents.74 When Patel suspected that she
was pregnant, she became nervous about her family’s reaction to this news. 75 In
a series of text messages described in court documents, Patel expressed her
confusion about pregnancy, her fear of being pregnant, and concerns about her
family to her friend Felicia Turnbo76:
[O]n June 4, Patel told Turnbo that she had not had an appetite “for a while
now” and indicated that she thought that she might be pregnant, but she
“hope[d] not!!!!!!!!!” Turnbo asked, “Have u missed?” Patel replied, “I
been cramping like crazy tho for weeks now so I’m hoping its cuz of
stress[.]” Turnbo responded, “Take a test!!!!!” Patel stated, “Hoping it all
just goes away lol[.]”
On June 10, Patel took a pregnancy test. She informed Turnbo that it
“didn’t even take a min[ute] for it to show” that she was pregnant and that
“[m]y Fam would kill me n him[.]” Patel stated, “U already know I can’t
have it[.]” Turnbo stated, “Now first we gotta get u to a dr. This may b[e]
something that ur body is deciding on its own[ . . . .] U can go to the urgent
care place even and tell them that u took a test and it shows positive but u
r cramping bad and spotting. They will do an ultrasound and let u know
then we will go from there[.] Patel stated, “I rather not even go to a
doc . . . just wanna get it over with[.]” . . .
On June 16, Patel told Turnbo, “Btw I just realized today I’ve missed 2.”
Turnbo replied, “You need to go to Dr. first[.]” Patel stated, “Yeah I think
we need to go this week[.]”77
There is no record of Patel ever going to a physician. Instead, she ordered
abortifacients from an online pharmacy in Hong Kong.78
On July 11, 2014, Patel ingested the abortifacients. Shortly after, she went
into her bathroom at home and delivered a fetus.79 Patel may have been in

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

DIMAIO & DIMAIO, supra note 64, at 352-53.
Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1044.
Id.
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1044-46.
Id. at 1045 (alterations and omissions in original).
Id.
Id. at 1046.
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shock.80 According to her testimony, she sat quietly in the bathroom for about
fifteen minutes before realizing she had to do something.81 Believing the fetus
to be dead, she put the fetus into a plastic bag and drove to a Target near her
work, leaving the bag in the dumpster.82 She then drove to the hospital, where
she arrived in bad physical condition, bleeding with her umbilical cord
protruding from her body.83 She was examined by two physicians. Although
Patel told them that she had been ten to twelve weeks pregnant, the physicians—
Dr Tracy Byrne and Dr. Kelly McGuire—examined Patel and found that, based
on her umbilical cord, the size of her placenta, and the state of her uterus, her
pregnancy was much further along.84 As Byrne prepared Patel for surgery to
remove placenta stuck to her uterine wall, McGuire—a member of the
Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists—contacted the
police.85 Upon the police’s arrival and in response to the doctors’ concern that
“there had to have been a baby,” Purvi disclosed the location of the fetus.86
McGuire left with the police and found the body in the dumpster of the parking
lot.87 A police officer came into the room and stood next to Patel’s bed,
presumably to ensure that she did not flee despite having recently given birth.
Patel was charged with feticide—”knowingly or intentionally terminat[ing] a
human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to
remove a dead fetus”88—and with neglect of a dependent resulting in death.
Neglecting a dependent requires a dependent that is alive. In turn, central to the
prosecution’s case was whether or not the child had been born alive or showed
evidence of life.89 In Indiana, a live birth is one in which there is a “birth of a
child who shows evidence of life after the child is entirely outside of the
mother.”90
Despite what appears to be clear legal guidance, the Patel case reveals an
enormous amount of confusion around making a determination of life.
Prosecutors exploit this confusion to introduce moral and ethical arguments.
During the trial, prosecutors painted Patel as a cold-blooded murderer:

80

Id. at 1050 n.9.
Id. at 1046.
82
Id. at 1046-47 (noting that Patel stated that infant was not moving or crying and that “it
was just a small little limpless body”).
83
Id. at 1046.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
IND. CODE § 35-42-1-6 (2017).
89
Transcript of Record at A7, State v. Patel, No. 71D08-1307-FA-00017 (St. Joseph
Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Patel Transcript].
90
IND. CODE § 16-18-2-205 (defining “live birth” and “birth”).
81
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Today as we stand here we’re not here just for laws of the defendant. We’re
here for a little boy. This whole production is about the little boy. A
baby. . . .
On July 13 the little boy was born on a cold, hard bathroom floor. The
only touch he got from his mother was to move him from that bathroom
floor into a garbage can. In that garbage can he was lying on and
surrounded by waste that no one wanted. From there he went to the bottom
of a cold, metal dumpster. He was born and died without being cared about,
without experiencing anything good. Not one second of comfort, not one
second of warmth. We’re here for a little boy that we can’t call by name
because he never got one.91
The State closed with an even stronger description of Patel’s purported
depravity:
She became a mother. And you know she did based on what we saw. She
saw her baby boy. We know she did. She was the only one in the bathroom.
She is the one that put him in the garbage. She chose to do nothing. . . . She
placed him in a dangerous situation. . . . She put him in the garbage and he
died. Those are the facts.92
Because it is not possible to kill a dead fetus, the prosecution had to prove
that there was a live child to secure a homicide conviction. This required an
autopsy and examination of the fetus. The forensic scientists turned to the HLT.
Two forensic pathologists testified at trial: Dr. Prahlow for the State93 and Dr.
Teas for the defense.94
The State’s forensic scientist explained his procedure:
PRAHLOW: The typical way that I do it and explained in multiple text
books, et cetera, is that you—you float the lungs—or you attempt to float
the lungs, you put those in water and you put the liver in water as a
comparison. And then you can even cut the lungs up into smaller pieces to
see if all of them float or just some of them. But the—the floating of the
entire thoracic block or just the heart attached to the lungs while described
by some pathologists is not universally practiced.
....
QUESTION: . . . When you performed the test, the lung floated, correct?
PRAHLOW: Yes, the lungs both floated and the liver sank, which
indicates that there is air in the lungs. And then I sectioned the
lungs . . . and portions of each lung floated while other portions sank.95

91
92
93
94
95

Patel Transcript, supra note 89, at D448-49.
Id. at D493.
See generally id. at 885-1030, 378-414.
See generally id. at 246-357.
Id. at B37-38.
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Based on this test, Prahlow concluded that the infant was born alive. 96 At the
same time, he acknowledged common problems with the test, including the
possibilities of human error, false positives, and false negatives. 97 Prahlow also
entertained the possibility that the fetus may have taken his one or more breaths
inside the birth canal.98 Where the infant may have taken a breath could
determine Patel’s culpability. Evidence that the child’s breath was inside the
birth canal would exculpate the mother. Based on the appearance of the fetus,
Prahlow found that it was likely to have been approximately twenty-five weeks
old.99
The forensic expert for the defense, Teas, arrived at competing conclusions.
First, Teas asserted that “there is actually a much greater chance of the baby
being 23 weeks gestation” than twenty-five weeks, as argued by Prahlow.100 The
dating of the fetus has important legal implications: the earlier the gestational
age, the less likely the child could have been born alive or could have been
sustained in a medical setting. Second, relying on Prahlow’s statement and
study, Teas also stated that there was no evidence of a live birth or a “separate
existence.”101 In fact, Teas argued that the HLT is “worthless” given the
frequency with which a stillborn child delivered in a hospital setting will test
positive for having taken a breath.102 Teas noted that even if one were to take the
test seriously, at the age and stage of lung development that Teas had placed the
fetus it would not be possible for lungs to show evidence of breathing.103 Finally,
Teas explained how lungs could contain oxygen and yet fail to prove life. First,
she argued, decomposition creates a “false positive” by producing oxygen in the
lungs.104 Decomposition may have begun given the time that lapsed between
when Patel delivered the fetus and when the fetus was found. Second, Teas
testified that because Patel stated that she opened the mouth of the fetus she may
have inadvertently let oxygen into the lungs, thus producing a false positive. 105

96

Id. at 1024 (“I believe that this baby was born alive, meaning that it breathed.”).
Id. at 947, 986 (acknowledging that “lung flotation test is necessarily unreliable all by
itself” given other possible explanations for oxygen in lung).
98
Id. at 939-40.
99
Id. at 381-82.
100
Id. at D330. Defense argued that counting the weeks from Patel’s last period as
indicated in a text message to a friend would place gestation at twenty-three weeks. See id. at
D481-82.
101
Id. at D255.
102
Id. at D256. Teas also discusses three other tests made unreliable by any sort of
resuscitation attempt or, as in Patel’s case, by moving the mouth, including conducting an xray to determine how far air entered into the lungs, testing the umbilical cord for a reaction,
and looking for water in the stomach, especially when the birth occurs in water. Id. at D25759. She also said that you can check for air in the middle ear. Id. at D259.
103
Id. at D284.
104
Id. at D300-01.
105
Id. at D300, D318.
97
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The jury found in favor of the prosecution.106 Patel was found guilty of
feticide and neglect of a dependent resulting in death. She was sentenced to thirty
years of imprisonment for neglect of a dependent, with twenty years executed,
and a concurrent executed term of six years for feticide.107
Patel appealed the conviction but not the sentence. Finding that the feticide
law was unconstitutional in its application against a pregnant woman, the
appeals court acquitted Patel of the crime.108 On the charge of felony neglect of
a dependent, the findings were more complex. The court did not question the
general validity of the HLT or its specific findings in this case—that the infant
had been born alive. Instead, the court asked whether or not Patel had
“knowingly placed her dependent in a dangerous situation” and whether doing
so had resulted in the dependent’s death.109 If her actions had not caused the
death, the charge could be reduced to a Class D felony of neglect of a dependent,
which carries a lesser sentence.110 The appeals court found that there was not
enough evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Patel caused the death
of the child.111 Thus, the court held that although an infant had been born alive,
Patel’s negligence had not been the cause of the child’s death. 112
Pro-choice organizations celebrated Patel’s release from prison on time
served.113 Yet it is important to note that when all was said and done, the HLT
went on the record as a legitimate test to demonstrate life. Further, the HLT’s
finding—in this case that Patel had given birth to a live child—was established
as fact.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HLT
The Patel case struck a nerve. In The New York Times Magazine, Emily
Bazelon warned that the prosecution of Patel was just the beginning of
miscarriage-related prosecutions and argued that the HLT was akin to
“witchcraft.”114 Advocates and members of the forensic science community
106

Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Id.
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Id. at 1062.
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Id. at 1049.
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Id. at 1048-49, 1052.
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Id. at 1052.
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Id. at 1055.
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See, e.g., Press Release, Planned Parenthood, Statement from Planned Parenthood
Federation of America President Cecile Richards on Indiana Court Overturning Feticide
Conviction of Purvi Patel (July 25, 2016), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/aboutus/newsroom/press-releases/statement-from-planned-parenthood-federation-of-americapresident-cecile-richards-on-indiana-court-overturning-feticide-convicti [https://perma.cc
/DAE2-LU6X].
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Emily Bazelon, Purvi Patel Could Be Just the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 1,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/magazine/purvi-patel-could-be-just-thebeginning.html.
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lamented the use of a “discredited” test.115 These accusations beg the question
of the history of the HLT.
Although histories contradict each other, several suggest that the idea that
oxygenated lungs float first originated with Galen, a physician and surgeon in
the Roman Empire around approximately 140 A.D.116 An actual forensic test
utilized for the purposes of criminal trials did not emerge until the seventeenth
century when the test became a tool for gathering evidence in infanticide
cases.117 As described by physician and medical ethicist Michael Ryan in the
1836 treatise A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence and State Medicine, the
procedure for the test included placing the lungs and heart in water the
“temperature of the atmosphere” and containing no salt.118 The description is
almost identical to the contemporary practice:
The lungs are to be taken out of the water, the large vessels tied, the heart
separated, and the organs then weighed to ascertain the proportion they
bear to the weight of the body. They are to be immersed again, then the
lobes separately, and lastly, each to be cut into small pieces. . . . Should the
fragments float, they are to be firmly squeezed in the hand, and again
placed in the water. . . . [A]nd if the segments float after firm pressure, then
the evidence is irresistible that the infant was born alive, and enjoyed
perfect respiration. If only the right lung, or its pieces float, the respiration
has been less perfect. If some pieces only float, while the greater number
sink, respiration has been still less complete. If neither the entire lungs nor
any section of them float in water, the evidence is decisive that the child
never respired.119
Despite the detailed description, Ryan highlights that the test should be
questioned for its capacity to tell whether or not a child was born alive.120 His
concern is that the test will provide false positives because of the ability of a
115

Neyfakh, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Sir Sydney Smith, The History and Development of Forensic Medicine, BRIT.
MED. J., Mar. 24, 1951, at 602-03 (noting that Galen remarked on “difference between the
lungs of a foetus and those of an infant who had breathed”).
117
ANNE-MARIE KILDAY, A HISTORY OF INFANTICIDE IN BRITAIN C. 1600 TO THE PRESENT
105 (2013).
118
MICHAEL RYAN, A MANUAL OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND STATE MEDICINE 306 (2d
ed. 1836).
119
Id. at 306-07.
In the 1828 Offenses against the Person Act, disposing of the body of a dead child in
order to conceal its birth, even if the child was still-born, became a separate offence for
which both unmarried and married women could be imprisoned for two years, with or
without hard labour.
Mark Jackson, The Trial of Harriet Vooght: Continuity and Change in the History of
Infanticide, in INFANTICIDE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD MURDER AND
CONCEALMENT, 1550-2000, at 1, 7 (Mark Jackson ed., 2002).
120
See RYAN, supra note 118, at 302 (“[T]he hydrostatic test can never prove positively
that the child was still-born, but only that it had not breathed.”).
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child to take a breath prior to being expelled from the woman and the ability of
lungs to float despite the absence of air.121 Ryan also highlights that the test has
fallen out of favor in Europe due to these issues but that “[s]ome of our best
jurists cling to it with a degree of tenacity which, to speak in the mildest terms,
is exceedingly remarkable.”122 Here, Ryan is sympathetic to the accused,
writing, “Suppose the accused do not allege uterine, vaginal, or extra-uterine
respiration before complete birth, are not the judges warranted to temper justice
with mercy, and to give the prisoner the benefit of the reasonable doubt in such
a case? Most decidedly.”123
Although Ryan’s book certainly suggests that cases of infanticide were
actively prosecuted in the early 1800s124 and that the FLT was actively utilized
(and discounted), the earliest case found in Westlaw documenting a court
grappling with questions of life and respiration in the United States was
published in 1876. In State v. Winthrop,125 a physician was charged with
producing the death of a child for whom he was caring during labor. 126 The
defense in Winthrop asked the court to give a jury instruction suggesting that a
child must be “fully born, and born alive, having an independent circulation and
existence separate from the mother” regardless of “whether the umbilical cord
which connects it with its mother be severed” to constitute a human being in the
eyes of the law.127 Instead, the court’s jury instructions stated:
If the child is fully delivered from the body of the mother, while the after
birth is not, and the two are connected by the umbilical cord, and the child
has independent life, no matter whether it has breathed or not, or an
independent circulation has been established or not, it is a human being, on
which the crime of murder may be perpetrated.128
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the jury instructions were incorrect.129 Citing
to English case law, Rex v. Enoch,130 and the Casper Book of Medical
Jurisprudence, the court held that a life cannot be established without

121

See id. at 300.
Id. at 299 (discussing validity of contention that “hydrostatic test is no longer
considered conclusive”). Ryan also writes, “If the death of a non-viable infant is less criminal
than abortion, the punishment of infanticide ought not to be inflicted, for this is inflicting the
greatest punishment for the lesser crime.” Id. at 280.
123
Id. at 301.
124
See D. Seaborne Davies, Child-Killing in English Law, 1 MOD. L. REV. 203, 208-11
(1937); Jeffrey A. Meldman, Legal Concepts of Human Life: The Infanticide Doctrines, 52
MARQ. L. REV. 105, 105-08 (1968).
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43 Iowa 519 (1876).
126
Id. at 519.
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Id. at 523, 520.
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Id. at 520 (emphasis omitted).
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Id. at 523 (reversing lower court based on jury instructions).
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(1833) 172 Eng. Rep. 1089; 5 Car. & P. 539.
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independent respiration and circulation.131 Rather than providing clarity, the
Winthrop case became the first in a long line of cases that seem to arbitrarily
apply factors, including independent respiration, independent circulation, and
amount of fetal expulsion from the mother, to determine life.
The earliest case documenting the use of the HLT, Wallace v. State,132 took
place in 1881. There, an African American infant was found dead in the
woods.133 The State charged Sallie Wallace with homicide by strangulation. 134
Ruling that the child was likely strangled but that it was difficult to tell due to
race—”Witness observed no signs of strangulation, which are swelling of the
face and protrusion of the tongue and eyes, but these signs would be less
observable in a negro than a white . . . .”135—the investigators set out to
determine if the child had been born alive prior to the strangulation. The
examiner applied the HLT.136 In this case, the test was described as follows:
“[The medical examiner] cut into the body and took out a piece of the lung about
as large as two of his fingers, threw it into a pan of water, and it floated. This
being sufficient to satisfy the jury, he made no further examination.” 137 While
acknowledging its limitations, the court noted that the test is the “best known to
medical science in determining whether air has entered the lungs.”138 Wallace’s
defense lawyers seized on the test’s uncertainty—presenting evidence by an
expert who testified that while the test is the best-known way of assessing
whether oxygen entered in the lungs, it cannot show that the infant did not take
a breath prior to expulsion from the mother.139 The court agreed, holding that
“[t]he child must be expelled completely from the mother, alive, before being
the subject of homicide.”140

131

Winthrop, 43 Iowa at 522-23 (“Beck says, however: ‘It must be evident that when a
child is born alive, but has not yet respired, its condition is precisely like that of the fœtus in
utero. It lives merely because the fœtal circulation is still going on. In this case none of the
organs undergo any changes.’ Casper says: ‘In foro the term “life” must be regarded as
perfectly synonymous with the term “respiration.” Life means respiration. Not to have
breathed is not to have lived.’” (first quoting THEODRIC ROMEYN BECK & JOHN B. BECK, 1
ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 498 (12th ed. 1863) (1823); and then quoting 3
JOHANN LUDWIG CASPER, A HANDBOOK OF THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC MEDICINE, BASED
UPON PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 33 (George William Balfour trans., 1864))).
132
10 Tex. Ct. App. 255 (1881).
133
Id. at 255-58.
134
Id. at 256.
135
Id. at 259.
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Id.
137
Id.
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Id. at 259-60.
139
Id. at 272-73 (citing State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519, 519 (1876)).
140
Id. at 273 (quoting 3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 136
(1860)); see also Nobles v. State, 68 S.W. 989, 991 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902) (citing Wallace,
10 Tex. Ct. App. at 272).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3478301

2020]

FLOATING LUNGS

1135

In the 1891 case Harris v. State,141 an infant was found dead on the edge of a
stream. The mother, Harris, claimed that the bruise on the head may have come
during delivery when the child’s head hit the floor due to the position in which
she had given birth.142 A medical examiner testified that although he utilized the
HLT in the forensic exam and therefore could say that the child had likely taken
a breath, he could not be positive.143 Harris won her appeal and was found
innocent of manslaughter.144
As time goes on, courts take their own approach to the HLT. 145 Some courts
find that the test cannot be held reliable given the critique of some forensic
scientists, while other courts reinforce the idea that when performed properly the
HLT is the most reliable means to prove or disprove life.146 The twentiethcentury cases continue this trend, with some courts acknowledging that the
capacity to determine when a fetus becomes a true human being borders on being
an arbitrary decision. In the 1947 case of People v. Chavez,147 for example, the
defendant, an unmarried twenty-one-year-old woman, was charged with
homicide for killing her newborn.148 The charge required that the child had been
born alive.149 The forensic scientist for the State found that there was air in the
lungs.150 In the back and forth about whether or not the child was alive, the court
states that “it is a difficult thing to draw a line and lay down a fixed general rule
as to the precise time at which an unborn infant, or one in the process of being
born, becomes a human being in the technical sense.”151 Despite this uncertainty,
the court agreed with the opinion of the autopsy physician: the infant was born
alive.152
Several cases demonstrate the way in which the HLT continues to animate
claims of objective determinations of life in contemporary cases with divergent
outcomes. Most deal with the issue of infanticide. In the 2006 case People v.
141

17 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891).
Id. at 1111.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
From the late 1800s to the mid-1900s, courts in Ireland raised a similar series of
concerns about the HLT. See Elaine Farrell, ‘A MOST DIABOLICAL DEED’: INFANTICIDE AND
IRISH SOCIETY, 1850-1900, at 59-60 (2013).
146
See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634, 639 (Wyo. 1963) (finding no error in trial
court’s rejection of jury instructions, which cast doubt on test purporting to show infant
breathed).
147
176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
148
Id.
149
Id. at 94 (noting that most jurisdictions still require proof that child existed “entirely
independent” of mother “before considering the infant as a human being”).
150
Id. at 93 (noting air in lungs but acknowledging that child could have breathed before
birth). It is unclear in this case whether the HLT was utilized to determine the presence of
oxygen in the lungs. No forensic test is specified.
151
Id. at 94.
152
Id. at 95.
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Scott,153 the finding of air in the lung contributed to the conviction of a woman
for a Class 2 felony,154 despite acknowledgements at the time that oxygen could
have entered the lungs in ways unrelated to the child breathing. In another 2006
case, In re M.F.,155 a child was found abandoned on the steps of a church. In the
case brought against the mother for second-degree murder, the court focused in
on the lack of ability to determine life based on the HLT:
Dr. McDonough opined that there are several ways to determine if a baby
was born alive. Food in the belly and post-natal activity are some
indicators, however there is no “good science” to resolve this question with
certainty. . . . While Dr. McDonough is familiar with the hydrostatic
test . . . other factors such as bacteria, gas, resuscitation, and the birth
process may contribute to the result of the lungs actually floating. 156
In the 2012 case State v. Robat,157 in which a mother was accused of drowning
her newborn, questions existed as to whether the infant was a stillborn or born
alive.158 The forensic scientists offered the floating lung test among others as a
demonstration that the child had taken several breaths. Robat was convicted of
second-degree murder.159 As we see in the Patel case and the cases that come
before it, the dependence on the HLT for a determination of life—no matter the
court’s treatment of the science—implicitly validates the correctness of the
test.160
V.

WHY DOES THE HLT PERSIST?

How does a test that is questioned by judges, forensic experts, and the public
survive? Given courts’ uneven treatment of the HLT, how do we explain its
persistence?
Drawing upon questions core to the studies of the sociology of science,
forensic science, and critical legal theory, this Part explores the challenges that
exist with regard to how courts admit scientific evidence and how court
processes legitimate even highly questionable forensic science. In this case,
through grappling with the validity of the HLT within the established rules of
the court—particularly through cross-examination, which gives the perception
that a scientific tool is defensible—the forensic science itself is reinforced as a
means to arrive at whether a life has begun.
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844 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
Id. at 434.
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831 N.Y.S.2d 360, 2006 WL 3626760 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Dec. 11, 2006) (unpublished
table decision).
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Id. at *5.
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49 A.3d 58 (R.I. 2012).
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Id. at 66.
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Id. at 70.
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These questions cannot be examined out of social context. The Patel case
offers an opportunity to interrogate the broader social and cultural frames that
allow for these prosecutions to move forward. In other words, it is necessary to
examine the racialized and gendered assumptions that shape decision-making in
the court in finding that a woman ought to be punished for her behavior during
or after pregnancy.
A.

The Failure of Evidentiary Standards

A key question in the Patel case and in other cases in which the HLT is
utilized is the admissibility of the test. This question raises the longer history of
when and how scientific evidence becomes admissible in criminal trials and
whether the existing standards mediate the introduction of rigorous and accepted
evidence.161
In 1923, Frye v. United States162 was the first attempt by the courts to
standardize the acceptance of scientific evidence into the courtroom. In Frye,
the court held that in order for scientific evidence to be admissible, expert
testimony must be generally accepted as relevant in the scientific community. 163
The Frye test has two steps: First, the court must determine who the relevant
scientific community is. Second, the court must determine whether the proposed
test is generally accepted in this community. 164
In 1975, nearly fifty years later, Rule 702 on expert testimony was adopted
into the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rule states in part that if “scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” then “a witness who is qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.”165 Unlike Frye, which speaks to the issue
of general acceptance, Rule 702 does not mention the scientific community, thus
producing confusion as to what constitutes admissible scientific expert
testimony. In 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,166 the
Supreme Court once again altered the rule on expert scientific testimony.
Daubert established that the judge has the task of ensuring that the testimony of
experts rests on a “reliable foundation” and is relevant to the case.167 Thus, the

161

See Lynn M. Paltrow & Kathrine D. Jack, Pregnant Women, Junk Science, and Zealous
Defense, CHAMPION, May 2010, at 30, 30 (describing scientific and expert testimony in
context of pregnancy and drug-use cases).
162
293 F. 1013 (1923), superseded by rule, FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
163
Id. at 1014.
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Id.
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FED. R. EVID. 702.
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509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Id. at 580.
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trial judge must make an assessment on whether scientific testimony is
“scientifically valid . . . [and] can be applied to the facts in issue.”168
In effect, the Daubert standard boils down to a set of five factors that a trial
court can consider to determine whether the methodology or underlying
reasoning of the expert is admissible and can be presented to a jury. The test
asks:
whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested,
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its known or
potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread
acceptance within a relevant scientific community. 169
The inquiry is meant to be flexible while focusing on the principles and
methodology stated in the five factors. Yet as science and technology studies
scholar Michael Lynch and his coauthors argue, after Daubert the ideas of expert
and expertise remained open-ended, creating confusion in lower courts.170 The
Daubert decision also left out an interpretation for nonscientific evidence
referenced in Rule 702. This was remedied in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,171
in which the Court extended the Daubert rules to all forms of expert testimony
offered in courts—not just scientific testimony. 172
Congress amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 2000 (and
then again slightly in 2007). In its current form, Rule 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.173
The Indiana Rules of Evidence, relevant to the Indiana courts in which the Patel
case was heard, have adopted their own version of Rule 702, which states that:
(a) A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 593.
Id. at 580 (syllabus).
LYNCH ET AL., supra note 8, at 47-48.
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Id. at 149.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
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specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied
that the expert testimony rests upon reliable scientific principles. 174
These rules for admissibility of scientific evidence raise a core question about
the capacity of courts to judge scientific principles or understand the product of
scientific consensus. This is what legal scholar Jennifer Mnookin has called
“epistemic competence”—the ability of juries to assess expertise.175 Daubert,
according to Mnookin, represents an attempt to address this issue. Daubert’s
goal was to allow the judge to become the gatekeeper of evidence, thereby
removing some of the burden from juries and leveling the bias built into the
oppositional expert process.176 Although it sets out to address the issue, Mnookin
argues that the Daubert standard does little to address some of the underlying
tensions and challenges generated by expert evidence in the court and often
cannot effectively address the concerns of partisanship and epistemic
competence.177 Importantly, as we see in the reproductive-rights context,
Daubert provides little headway in ensuring that the court is critically
interrogating scientific claims in order to ground decisions on current scientific
evidence. For juries, which eventually must adjudicate the expert evidence
before them, Daubert does little to mitigate the lack of prior knowledge or ideas
about what to do when there is no scientific consensus.
As has been acknowledged by many academics and advisory groups on
forensic science, Daubert and its legacy have had little effect on ensuring rigor
in the science presented in the criminal law setting. In the 2016 National
Academy of Sciences Report to the President, Forensic Science in Criminal
Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods, the
authors noted that there is a troubling lack of interrogation by courts of the type
and quality of evidence before the court.178 Other critics of forensic evidence
attack the idea that the courtroom and the competing testimony of experts
provide enough exposure to juries and judges with regard to the challenges of a
given forensic test. In some instances, this is due to the fact that crossexamination may be ineffective if a defense attorney lacks knowledge or that it
is not possible to galvanize the necessary experts, materials, or understanding to
challenge evidence and expertise put forward by the prosecution. This is
particularly true of underresourced and understaffed public defenders’ offices.
174

IND. R. EVID. 702.
Mnookin, supra note 7, at 1009.
176
Id. at 1018.
177
Id. at 1019.
178
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 67 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites
/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R24U-WDGD].
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Some scholars have gone so far to assert that Frye and Daubert have essentially
been irrelevant to criminal trials given that nearly all scientific evidence makes
its way into the trials despite the widespread acknowledgement that the forensic
science underpinning much expert testimony has come under scrutiny for its
production of false positives.179
It shouldn’t be surprising, then, that Purvi Patel’s attorney brought an
unsuccessful challenge against the HLT’s admissibility. 180 As documented in the
pretrial transcript, Patel’s attorney Sanford argued that they were not attempting
to exclude Prahlow, the State’s forensic expert, based on his expert status or
knowledge but rather based on the process he used to make his final
determinations of fact with regard to the infant having been born alive.181 It is
worth reading through the language of the transcript, which demonstrates
Prahlow’s own doubt about the HLT:
SANFORD: Isn’t the correct way of doing [the FLT] to keep the heart and
the lungs together when you do the float test?
PRAHLOW: There are those that advocate for that but I was never taught
that method, and I would venture to say most forensic pathologists don’t
use that description of the method.
The typical way that I do it and explained in multiple text books, et
cetera, is that you—you float the lungs—or you attempt to float the lungs,
you put those in water and you put the liver in water as a comparison. And
then you can even cut the lungs up into smaller pieces to see if all of them
float or just some of them. But the—the floating of the entire thoracic block
or just the heart attached to the lungs while described by some pathologists
is not universally practiced.
SANFORD: Okay. So that wouldn’t be—the way you did the test would
be acceptable, is that what you’re saying?
PRAHLOW: Yes.
....
SANFORD: If somebody advocated that, would that be an acceptable way
of performing the test?
PRAHLOW: So long as they went on to continue with the entire process
and then separated the lungs and floated those separately comparing to
another organ such as a liver, yes.
....
SANFORD: Okay. When you performed the test, the lung floated, correct?

179

Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Uncertain Future of Forensic Science, DAEDALUS, Fall 2018,
at 99, 112.
180
IND. R. EVID. 702(b) (“Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is
satisfied that the expert testimony rests upon reliable scientific principles.”).
181
Patel Transcript, supra note 89, at B30-50.
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PRAHLOW: Yes, the lungs both floated and the liver sank, which
indicates that there is air in the lungs. And then I sectioned the
lungs . . . and portions of each lung floated while other portions sank.
SANFORD: Okay. And would you agree, Doctor, that the float test in and
of itself isn’t a reliable determine—test to determine whether or not there
was a breath taken?
PRAHLOW: Yes.
SANFORD: Okay.
THE COURT I’m sorry, was your question that the float test —
SANFORD: In and of itself —
THE COURT: In and of itself is not reliable —
SANFORD: Right.
THE COURT: — (continuing) to determine whether a breath was taken?
SANFORD: Right.
THE COURT: And you agreed with that statement.
PRAHLOW: I agree with that.182
During cross examination, Prahlow reiterated the potential unreliability of the
HLT if conducted outside of context by stating:
And as I testified earlier, the flotation test in and of in itself is—should be
considered unreliable. You have to take it—take the results of that in the
context of the overall circumstances of the case as well as other findings,
and the other—that other observation was upon removal of the chest plate
of the baby at autopsy, the lungs, which appeared pink, spongy and were
essentially filling the pleural cavities or the chest cavities. And that is
distinctly consistent with having air in the lungs.183
Later, Prahlow again clarifies that forensic science is different from other
types of science:
[F]orensic pathology and actually in medicine in general, the science that
we deal with is not necessarily what a lot of people think about as science
meaning, you know, there’s a—the scientific method is employed and we
have an experiment and we make observations and then make
determinations based on those experiments. We just can’t do that with—
with people so a lot of it is experiential, if you will, just making
observations about things over the years, things that we’ve seen.
....
So, for example, now some—some folks have done studies such
as . . . including adding the flotation test in there and show that it’s
relatively reliable, the flotation test as well as seeing the air within the lungs
182
183

Id. at B36-39.
Id. at B60.
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with the caveats that we’ve described as far as the false positives and false
negatives. Not every baby that is born alive will have lungs that float and
not every lung that floats occurs in a baby that was alive, but those are
typically—accounted for by decomposition or attempts at resuscitation,
breathing air into the lungs.
So there is . . . science out there as far as some reports and series that
confirm that, yes, although this test in and of itself is unreliable, the
flotation test, in combination with seeing the air in the lungs and then ruling
out the other causes of it, it is—it is reliable. 184
As the hearing came to a close, Sanford stated:
I mean there’s no disputing that Dr. Prahlow is an expert in his field.
Nobody is disputing that. But there ought to be some sort of scientific
support for his conclusions, and I don’t think that that—I’m not saying that
he doesn’t have scientific support for some of his conclusions but I doubt—
I don’t think he does for all of them. 185
The State clarified:
And in closing I guess the only thing that we’re disputing here is whether
there is enough reliability upon scientific principles here.
The State concedes essentially that Dr. Prahlow’s testimony does not
satisfy all of the standards laid out in Daubert but lucky for us Daubert
isn’t controlling. That is something the Court can look to for a guideline
essentially only. The Court need only be satisfied that the sufficient
foundation has been made showing that the relevant signs of the principles
are reliable.186
The State argued that it satisfied the requirement of Rule 702(a) of the Indiana
Rules of Evidence that is reserved to a consideration of the fact that Prahlow is
an expert and has “sufficient qualifications” to testify in court.187 The defense,
as is apparent from the transcript, focused on the process by which Prahlow
reached his conclusion.
There are several aspects about this exchange and the Indiana Rule 702
challenge that are worth noting, primarily because the pretrial discussion mirrors
many Daubert critiques and evidentiary standards as a means of addressing core
issues of scientific expertise and validity of evidence in a court. First, as has been
raised by many critics of Daubert, it is apparent here that expert knowledge was
required of the lawyers in order to effectively question a forensic scientist. 188
The need for expert knowledge becomes clear in the Patel case when Prahlow
argues that it is common knowledge in the field is that the HLT is considered
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at B62-64.
Id. at B81.
Id. at B82-83.
Id. at B82.
See id. at B37.
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valid when paired with another test.189 To adequately respond to a claim like this
requires a defense attorney to know and understand the debates about forensic
methods.190 Second, Indiana Rule 702 is interpreted by the State and the court
as largely speaking to Prahlow’s capacity as an expert and not to either his
method or the test itself.191 This divests the court of the ability to make a
judgment about the testimony itself as advised by Daubert. Patel’s defense notes
that what is at issue is not Prahlow’s expert status but instead the content of his
testimony.192
Finally, the defense highlights that the allure of expertise itself might blind
the lay juror to their own ability to critique:
[T]here is a risk that the jury would make an irrational finding of causation
based on the siren-like allure of opinions stated by highly qualified experts.
Thus, an expert’s opinion must have some basis other than the hypothesis
before the opinion may have the privilege of being assailed by crossexamination.193
The defense introduces the idea that jurors lack the capacity to make findings
of fact when they are not themselves experts.194 In fact, in Patel’s case, it was
the jury that was finally tasked with determining whether or not the child was
born alive.195 As many scholars have highlighted, this raises the particular issue
that even when permitted to do so, neither a jury nor a judge might be capable
of distilling competing expert testimony given that they may have only a lay
understanding of the science.
The narrow reading of Indiana Rule 702 resulted in the admissibility of
Prahlow’s testimony and the eventual finding of life.196 As we see in the Patel
case, the judge acknowledged that while the evidence offered by the State did
not meet the Daubert standard, the less rigorous Rule 702 was applied instead.197
By filtering the HLT through evidentiary processes, the court legitimated the test
as an accurate and objective measure of life. This legitimation in turn enabled
the prosecution of Patel and enables the prosecution of others in her
circumstances.

189

Id. at B64.
Innocence Network Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 3-7 (offering an overview of
critiques from forensic scientists on the use of HLT).
191
Patel Transcript, supra note 89, at B82 (“The defense has essentially conceded the fact
that the witness has sufficient qualifications to testify under 702(A).”).
192
Id. at B83.
193
Id. at B85.
194
Id.
195
Id. at B96.
196
Id. at B91 (showing court’s acknowledgement of admissibility).
197
Id. at B84.
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Social and Political Context

Most discussions of the interaction between forensic science and law (or
between science and law more broadly) suggest that the two are independent
systems of authority operating in unique domains. In these accounts, interaction
between law and science is mitigated in courts through formal and neutral
processes.
Understanding the HLT in its social and political context requires us to
challenge this understanding of how science and law interact. As sociology-ofscience scholars argue, science, evidence, and expertise emerge from and are
shaped by societal norms. The law is core to shaping societal norms. Courts are
not simply recipients of scientific knowledge. Instead, judicial processes play an
integral role in shaping and legitimating scientific authority and fact. In other
words, we can understand the science and law as constitutive of one another—
rather than seeing them as independent authoritative forces—both in terms of
substance and the way each constitutes the other as independent and objective. 198
The Patel case and the forensic science of the HLT offer an opportunity to
question the purported bifurcation between law and science. The use of the HLT
and its treatment as a legitimate test forces us to ask how and why courts have—
over time and despite the procedural protections to guard against faulty forensic
evidence—consistently legitimated the test as capable of determining the truth
of whether a child was born alive. To be sure, courts have not always taken the
HLT as truth. As seen in the history of cases that utilize the test, courts were
often skeptical of early claims that the test could verify life.199 Yet today, nearly
100 years after the earliest published cases discussing the HLT, despite
skepticism about the test and growing disagreement about its capacity to
accurately speak to a person’s culpability, it continues to be used to validate life.
In allowing the HLT to serve as the standard for judging when life begins,
courts repeatedly legitimate the purported correctness of the test itself. But why
do they do so? This Section offers two possible explanations: first, the desire to
blame and the need for finality, and second, as a response to racialized and
gendered anxieties around pregnancy, childbirth, and caretaking.
i.

Blame and Finality

Finality is the idea that all cases must reach a conclusion. This powerful idea
in law prevents further appeal because a case has been fully resolved. In its most
extreme form, the death penalty offers a “grand finality.”200 Finality represents
198
Jasanoff, supra note 25, at 123. This distinction is replicated in most guidance on
forensic science and expertise, including the most recent National Academy of Sciences
guidelines, which emphasize that forensic science and the law of forensic science operate in
unique domains.
199
See supra Part IV.
200
Daniel S. Medwed, Grand Finality: Post-conviction Prosecutors and Capital
Punishment, in FINAL JUDGMENTS: THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE 90,
94 (Austin Sarat ed., 2017).
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the desire of participants in the legal system to arrive at an answer and animates
the systemic response that drives prosecutions. Finality is also deeply related to
society’s need to blame and to find accountability.
Concerns over finality, blame, and responsibility drive the treatment of crimes
during pregnancy and in the course of caretaking. In her book Flawed
Convictions, Professor Tuerkheimer explores why and how three neurological
symptoms came to be called “shaken baby syndrome” and equated with
homicide.201 In her account, the desire to blame aided in legitimating the medical
diagnosis of SBS. Tuerkheimer describes this phenomenon, which she argues is
heightened when an infant dies:
The death of a baby is one of life’s most devastating tragedies, as is the
severe neurological impairment of a once-healthy child. In the face of such
misfortune, finding fault can be irresistible. The impulse to blame is
powerful, not only for parents, but also for doctors, police, prosecutors,
judges, and jurors (many of whom are also parents themselves). Rather than
confront the absence of a wrongdoer, we identify a perpetrator who can be
held responsible for awful circumstances.202
As more women use medication abortion—with many accessing the
medication online and without medical supervision—more women may be
vulnerable to prosecution. Several factors contribute to women’s vulnerability
to being prosecuted: First, states increasingly attempt to define life as beginning
earlier. The earlier in pregnancy life begins the more possible it is to prosecute
a woman for infanticide for having or attempting to have an abortion. Second, if
abortion restrictions continue to increase, more women will seek to self-induce
abortion, and the unmonitored use of abortifacients can result in abortions when
the pregnancies are outside of the legal or medically proscribed period for an
abortion to take place.203 The Patel case exemplifies how this plays out in the
context of an increasingly conservative legal abortion regime. There is no sign
that the conflation of abortion and infanticide or conservative lawmaking in this
arena will slow. To the contrary, the antichoice groups continue to prioritize
infanticide as a rallying cry.204
The push for finality and blame will continue to animate the response to the
HLT despite the uncomfortable reality that we may not be able to determine
whether a child is born alive or not. Abandoning this uncertain test becomes the
only option, yet it is a difficult one to bear for those who seek finality through
the law.

201

TUERKHEIMER, supra note 9, at 5.
Id. at 13.
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Laura Bassett, Republicans Are Pushing Another False Claim About Abortion to Rile
Up Voters, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019, 12:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/2019/04/10/republicans-are-pushing-another-false-claim-about-abortion-rile-upvoters/.
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The Science of Moral Panics

The concept of a “moral panic” was first identified in 1972 by scholar Stanley
Cohen.205 Cohen defines moral panic as:
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become
defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in
a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral
barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other rightthinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and
solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the
condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more
visible.206
As described by Cohen, the work of making a moral panic is done by experts
and leaders who make something hidden real.207 In her work on fetal alcohol
syndrome, Armstrong describes how “moral entrepreneurs,” self-driven
individuals who see evil and decide to act upon it, took it upon themselves to
end what they began to see as a diagnosable condition.208 This requires what
Armstrong describes as “medical moral entrepreneurs”—physicians and
researchers who set about to characterize and diagnose fetal alcohol
syndrome.209 These medical moral entrepreneurs had legitimacy due to their
expertise as physicians.210 They were able to ground their moral claim not only
in cultural and social terms but also in science itself.211
Following Cohen and Armstrong, I posit here that the prosecution of women
for self-inducing abortion or abandoning a stillbirth represents a moral panic
rooted in the idea that women who are pregnant must behave in line with a true
maternal instinct.212 This maternal instinct guides a pregnant woman against
abortion—and certainly late-term abortion. It also drives an instinct to seek help
205

STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 1 (1972).
Id. Cohen also described the elements of a moral panic:
They are new (lying dormant perhaps, but hard to recognize; deceptively ordinary and
routine, but invisibly creeping up the moral horizon)—but also old (camouflaged
versions of traditional and well-known evils). They are damaging in themselves—but
also merely warning signs of the real, much deeper and more prevalent condition. They
are transparent (anyone can see what’s happening)—but also opaque: accredited experts
must explain the perils hidden behind the superficially harmless (decode a rock song’s
lyrics to see how they led to a school massacre).
Id. at vii-viii.
207
Id. at viii (discussing how “experts must explain the perils hidden behind the
superficially harmless”).
208
Armstrong, supra note 29, at 2025.
209
Id. at 2036.
210
Id. at 2039.
211
Id.
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See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 264 (1992) (discussing
assumptions about sex roles in abortion lawmaking).
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for the products of birth no matter when in the pregnancy an abortion takes place.
Patel did not act as a mother should. As the prosecution described, Patel gave
birth to her son and killed him. Her picture in handcuffs in The New York Times
and Indiana papers, with her hair falling before her face as she walked, head
down in shame, reinforced the idea that she had done something wrong. 213
However, as with the HLT, the courts can reclaim a neutral perspective on
infanticide, with forensic science providing the purportedly evenhanded method
of ascertaining life. In turn, the reliance on the HLT by the courts reinforces the
test as capable of producing fact.
VI. A WAY FORWARD
In this Part, I offer a solution for addressing the concerns raised by the HLT:
we must discount the forensic science entirely and end its use as a way of
substantiating life.214
Ending the use of the HLT would result in a shift from finding false positives
(i.e., finding women guilty who have not intentionally killed an infant) to
potentially finding more false negatives (i.e., finding more women innocent who
may have intentionally killed a child). This shift challenges our moral sensibility
around the death of infants immediately following birth, given the idea that we
as a society must immediately and urgently respond to infanticide.215
While this solution is radical with regard to the discomfort associated with a
decrease in false positives (i.e., the possibility that some people who give birth
will kill their newborn and get away with it), it comports with the critique offered
of the test. Time and time again, courts have caved to the use of the HLT because
it is the best test offered rather than the most reliable test for determinations of
life.216 And although courts acknowledge the moral and scientific complexity of
determining whether or not there was a life, they lose sight of it in a world in
which guilt or innocence rides on a truth claim. This is not to say that the
critiques of the test are not considered by courts in the context of individual
cases. Courts and juries are often presented with the many weaknesses of the
test: a lack of reliability, the impossibility of proving where a newborn took a
breath (inside or outside the birth canal), or that oxygenation was due solely to
breathing. The Patel case is a stunning example of how the critiques are both
heard and discounted.217 It serves as a reminder of the pull to find culpability.
The HLT begs more existential questions as well, far outside the scope of this
Essay but nevertheless necessary to ask: How do we determine when life begins?
And what constitutes a life?
213

Bazelon, supra note 114.
This recommendation is in line with critics of the test in the forensic science
community. See Innocence Network Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 11.
215
Sheila Jasanoff, Science, Common Sense & Judicial Power in U.S. Courts, DAEDALUS,
Fall 2018, at 15, 15.
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See Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1047 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
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The question of where a breath is taken exemplifies the uncertainty embedded
in this question. In the Patel case, the trial court questioned whether the breath
that made the lungs float was taken inside or outside the birth canal.218 The
answer remained unresolved as the court found for life based on the HLT,
implicitly validating the idea that life could begin inside the birth canal—despite
the legal rule stating that complete expulsion from the mother is required for a
determination of life.219 These questions have haunted the court for over a
hundred years. Take the 1881 case Wallace v. State, in which the court
remarkably posed the same question: Does a breath count if taken in the birth
canal?220 To this the court answered that the child must be fully expelled from
the mother:
Such creatures are in being when wholly born alive. The extent of birth is
defined by our Code to be actual birth. The court below, recognizing the
necessity of explaining to the jury what actual means, our Code being
silent, very properly goes to common law authority and draws therefrom
the accurate idea of complete expulsion of the child from the body of the
mother.221
Has a mother killed her child? The answer is not based on scientific truth as
the HLT suggests but rather on the combination of a set of legal and regulatory
arrangements that seek to define life based on political compromise, medical
knowledge, and subjective ideas of when life begins. This lack of clarity over
the years has allowed for a nearly ad hoc process in determining whether or not
a child was born.
CONCLUSION
This Essay historicizes and questions the forensics of the hydrostatic lung test
used to prove that a mother has killed her child. The urgency of this assessment
is clear in a political moment in which more women will self-induce abortion
due to a lack of access to legal abortion. As in the Purvi Patel case, in which she
did not know how far along in her pregnancy she was, others who mistakenly or
intentionally self-induce abortion after twenty weeks of pregnancy risk being
prosecuted for murder, negligence resulting in death, infanticide, or other related
crimes. These crimes require a child to have been born alive, and the HLT is one
of the few tests available to prove life.
This Essay argues that ongoing legitimation of the HLT can be explained by
our moral sensibilities around pregnancy and parenting as well as to strong
desires for legal finality and blame in the context of a supposed infant death. Yet
the HLT is incapable of demonstrating culpability. Given the many questions
that the HLT is unable to answer and the many more it produces, this Essay
218
219
220
221

Innocence Network Amicus Brief, supra note 68, at 7.
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Wallace v. State, 10 Tex. Ct. App. 255, 263 (1881).
Id. at 263-64 (emphases omitted).
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concludes that the HLT should not be relied upon for determining life and, in
turn, for determining the guilt or innocence of a mother.
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